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PRACTICAL RATIONALITY AND
IDIOSYNCRATIC BELIEFS
John T. Mullen

William Alston has defended "Christian Mystical Perception" against the
charge of irrationality by claiming that the social establishment of a "doxastic
practice" confers what he calls "practical rationality" on those who engage in
it. I argue that a thought experiment involving a possible world at which
there is no epistemic defeat reveals that social establishment is not a necessary
condition for practical rationality (as Alston defines it), and that all belief-formers are prima facie practically rational. However, I also argue that the modification to Alston's "doxastic practice" approach to epistemology that is
required by this thought experiment does no damage to Alston's subsequent
defense of "Christian Mystical Perception." I then address the objection that
some beliefs are so repugnant that they should not be regarded as even prima
facie practically rational, and conclude with a practical benefit that the modified approach enjoys over Alston's original approach.

Chapter four of William Alston's Perceiving God is an explication of what
he calls "a 'doxastic practice' approach to epistemology."l That approach
is crucial to Alston's subsequent defense of those who engage in Christian
Mystical Perception (of God, usually) against charges of irrationality,
where Christian Mystical Perception is conceived as a distinct "doxastic
practice." Central to Alston's "doxastic practice approach" is the concept
of IJpractical rationality." Though the name might suggest the ascription of
one of the more familiar concepts of rationality (such as fitting means to
ends, or having properly functioning cognitive faculties, etc.) to a person in
virtue of engaging in a given doxastic practice, that is not what Alston has
in view. Rather, practical rationality is itself a distinct type of rationality
that a believing subject might possess. It is the sort of rationality one possesses when there is "no rational alternative" to forming beliefs in the ways
one actually forms them. Alston says that he "calls this rationality 'practical' to differentiate it from the rationality we would show to attach to a
belief if solid grounds for its truth were adduced, or to attach to a doxastic
practice if sufficient reasons were given for regarding it as reliable" (p.
168). He then goes on to assuage any concerns that might arise from our
lack of voluntary control over our beliefs by specifying that practical rationality is the type of rationality we possess when it is rational for us to
"stick with what we have, if we had a choice" (p. 168). The key to Alston's
"doxastic practice approach" then, is his claim that it is prima facie rational
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(in the sense of practical rationality) for a subject to engage in a doxastic
practice just if the practice is "socially established," and it is unqualifiedly
rational (in the same sense) to engage in it just if the practice is socially
established and "not discredited by being shown to be unreliable or deficient in some other way that will cancel its prima facie rationality" (p. 194).
One might think of the latter clause as a "provided nothing defeats"
addendum to the claim that the social establishment of a doxastic practice
confers practical rationality on those who engage in it. Presumably, one of
the "other ways" a doxastic practice might be deficient is that it might be
irrational to engage in it according to some other concept of rationality. So
if Alston can successfully show (as I believe he has) that Christian Mystical
Perception is both socially established and not otherwise deficient, then he
has successfully defended those who engage in it against charges of irrationality. All of this is quite familiar to readers of Alston.
One of my two aims in this essay is to show that prima facie practical
rationality, as Alston defines it, is possessed not only by those who engage
in socially established practices, but by all belief-formers whatsoever. This
represents a significant broadening of the scope of practical rationality over
what Alston allows. It is meant to include even those who hold beliefs that
might be called "idiosyncratic," where an idiosyncratic belief is (let us say)
a belief such that the subject cannot classify it as the output of a socially
established doxastic practice. However, my other aim in this essay is to
show that Alston's "doxastic practice approach" and subsequent defense
of Christian Mystical Perception is not at all threatened by this broader
scope. Indeed, my argument for the latter claim is suggested by Alston
himself in his brief consideration of the possibility that persons with idiosyncratic beliefs might be prima facie practically rational.
A brief thought experiment will be helpful in showing that all belief-formers are prima facie practically rational. Let us imagine a world filled
with belief-formers who are very much like ourselves in that they form a
great multitude and variety of beliefs, but very much unlike ourselves in
that no belief of theirs has ever been defeated. No one in this world has
ever had the experience of noting that two of their beliefs contradict each
other, thereby forcing a revision. Nor has anyone ever encountered another person who holds a contrary belief. In this world, everyone agrees with
everyone about everything. So this world is, as far as its denizens can tell,
a world of epistemic perfection. I will therefore call it "Epistopia." Now
the epistemologists of Epistopia are well aware of logic and of the potential
for conflicting beliefs. It is just that this possibility has never been actual
for them. They have also reflected a great deal on their belief-forming
mechanisms and have been able to classify them into a number of distinct
types, all of which are (as far as they can tell) perfectly reliable. They have
also noted that they cannot show that any of their belief-forming mechanisms are reliable, and they have experienced the same puzzlement as us
over what sort of response should be given to those who would question
their reliability. Their condition is also like ours in that not all of their
beliefs can be neatly classified as products of the distinct practices that they
have thus far identified. Every now and then someone has a belief that
resists any such classification, but of course the hypothesis is that none of
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those beliefs has ever been defeated either. And these latter beliefs, the
ones that resist classification as products of an identifiable doxastic practice, fit our definition of an "idiosyncratic" belief. If an individual or small
group were to develop a history of forming beliefs in a new, as yet unclassified but nevertheless classifiable way, then they will have established a
new doxastic practice in Epistopia. Since this new practice would presumably fall short of social establishment (at least for a time), we may call a
practice of this sort an "idiosyncratic practice." Epistopia is, admittedly, a
very implausible world, but its logical possibility is sufficient for the purposes of this thought experiment.
Now let us ask whether the idiosyncratic believers in Epistopia are practically rational in holding their idiosyncratic beliefs and in engaging in
their idiosyncratic practices. 2 If they are, then pace Alston, the social establishment of a doxastic practice is not a necessary condition for practical
rationality. We may begin by looking closely at the argument Alston himself gives for the prima facie practical rationality of those who engage in
socially established doxastic practices. It is a very persuasive argument.
Can it be applied with equal force to the idiosyncratic believers in
Epistopia? It seems to me that it can. It is found in section (ii) of chapter
four (pp. 149-53). I shall present it from the point of view of an epistemologist in Epistopia, and borrow heavily from Alston's own language. But I
shall omit his references to distinct practices and substitute instead general
references to the belief-forming mechanisms of the denizens of Epistopia. I
shall also make occasional modifications to Alston's presentation, as necessary. So, let us imagine an Epistopian epistemologist presenting the following argument:
Let us inquire into what may be said in general about the epistemic
status of our beliefs, and the mechanisms by which they form. Given
that we will inevitably run into epistemic circularity at some point(s)
in any attempt to provide direct arguments for the reliability of one
or another of our belief-forming mechanisms, we should draw the
conclusion that there is no appeal beyond the mechanisms with
which we actually find ourselves. We cannot look into any issue
without employing some way of forming and evaluating beliefs; that
applies as much to issues concerning the reliability of our actual
belief-forming mechanisms as to any issue. Hence what alternative is
there to employing the mechanisms we find ourselves using, to
which we find ourselves firmly committed, and which we could
abandon or replace only with extreme difficulty if at all? The classical skeptical alternative of withholding belief altogether is not a serious possibility. In the press of life we are continually forming beliefs
about a great variety of things, whether we will or no. Some of these
beliefs fall into distinct categories, and some do not. Among those
that do, some are socially established and some are not. But even if
we could replace our present belief-forming mechanisms with some
others of our own devising, why should we? What possible rationale
could there be for such a substitution? It is not as if we would be in a
better position to provide a non-epistemically circular support for the
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reliability of these replacement mechanisms. The same factors that
prevent us from establishing the reliability of our present mechanisms without epistemic circularity would operate with the same
force in these other cases. Hence we are just not in a position to get
beyond, or behind, our present mechanisms and criticize them from
that deeper or more objective position. Our Epistopian cognitive situation does not permit it. Again, we cannot take a step in intellectual
endeavors without employing some belief-forming mechanism or
other, and what reasonable alternative is there to employing the ones
with which we actually find ourselves?
These considerations seem to me to indicate that it is eminently
reasonable for us to form beliefs in the ways we actually do. If there
were some good reason to doubt any of our beliefs, then we would
be faced with the painful tasks of distinguishing reliable mechanisms
from unreliable mechanisms and of abandoning those we deem unreliable, however difficult that may be. But since we have no such reasons, it is very clear that the reasonable thing to do is to retain all the
beliefs we actually have.
Perhaps we have concluded too hastily that we have no reasonable alternative to forming beliefs according to all the belief-forming
mechanisms with which we find ourselves. Why shouldn't we take
our stand on one or more of those types of mechanisms that are firmly
entrenched (i.e., socially established) in our lives, and hold the others
(especially those that produce beliefs that seem to resist classification
into distinct practices) subject to judgment on that basis? But those
who would do this are vulnerable to the charge of "undue partiality." Why should we hold some mechanism or type of mechanism
under extra suspicion simply on the basis of its relative rarity? Why
is that a cause for any special concern about its reliability? We have
no reasons to doubt any of them, and they all "came out of the same
shop" (as an Epistopian wise man of old once said). If one of them is
suspect so are all the others. Where it is reliability that is in question,
we lack sufficient excuse for treating different mechanisms in a fundamentally different way.
Thus we should follow the lead of the wise man of old and take
all our belief-forming mechanisms to be acceptable as such, as innocent until proven guilty. They all deserve to be regarded as rationally
engaged in, pending the acquisition of reasons for disqualification.
But we Epistopians have no such reasons. 3
It seems clear to me that this argument should be just as convincing to
the Epistopians as Alston's original argument is to us, if not more so. But if
that is correct, then it looks as if the idiosyncratic believers in Epistopia are
practically rational. They have "no rational alternative" to forming beliefs
as they do. And if that is so, then it is not the social establishment of a doxastic practice that confers practical rationality on those who engage in it.
Rather, that work is apparently being done by the very act of forming a
belief Or, if one prefers, one might say that belief formation in general is a
practice or activity such that an who engage in it are prima facie practically
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rational in doing so. The utter absence of defeat in Epistopia seems to
show that social establishment is, for us, not a source of practical rationality,
but rather a very powerful and important preserver of rationality. Or, more
standardly, one might say that the lack of social establishment functions for
us as a very powerful defeater. Social establishment seems to be a test that
we humans, in response to our epistemically imperfect condition, apply to
our beliefs very shortly after they have formed. The application of this test
may be both unconscious and involuntary, but that is of course no reason
to think that we do not apply it. But passing the test of social establishment merely preserves the practical rationality that we already possess simply in virtue of having formed a belief. And of course there are, as Alston
says, many other tests that must be passed in order for one of us humans to
be unqualifiedly rational in our believings. We humans, in sharp contrast
to the Epistopians, have acquired very good reasons to be very suspicious
of our idiosyncratic beliefs and practices, and so the lack of social establishment functions in our lives as an extremely powerful undercutting
defeater. Indeed, it is so powerful as a defeater that we might easily be led
to mistake it for the very source of practical rationality. But a little reflection on the condition of the Epistopians, I think, reveals that it is not a
source, but merely a preserver.
In a footnote near the end of his argument Alston describes this "innocent until proven guilty" attitude as "a kind of 'negative coherentism' for
socially established practices," and then adds that he is "not at all tempted
by a negative coherentism with respect to beliefs" (p. 153, n. 10). However
he does not supply us with an argument at that point. We are left to wonder why we should not take the same attitude toward all our beliefs.
Presumably, there is something very uncomfortable about regarding ourselves as prima facie practically rational in all of our believings, and Alston
may be concerned that this discomfort (whatever it amounts to) will in
some way threaten his "doxastic practice approach" as a whole and, as a
consequence of that, undercut the very effective use he has made of that
approach (i.e., rus defense of Christian Mystical Perception). Or it may be
that it just seems too counter-intuitive. But what is the source of this discomfort, exactly? If we could identify it more precisely, we would be in a
better position to determine just how much damage this thought experiment has done to Alston's approach and defense.
The only modification of the approach that seems required of us thus far
is that we must now regard social establishment as a preserver of practical
rationality, and not as a source of it. Is this modification the source of the
alleged discomfort? I cannot see why it should be. It does not seem to
have any effect at all on Alston's defense of Christian Mystical Perception.
We may still distinguish one doxastic practice from another, just as we did
before making the modification. Similarly, every belief must be the product of a socially established doxastic practice in order for the subject to be
unqualifiedly rational in holding it, and that too represents no change from
our situation prior to making the modification. And it is very hard to see
how this modification would require Alston to change anything he has
said about either the social establishment of Christian Mystical Perception
or the lack of any disqualifying deficiencies with respect to it. Thus far, it
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seems to be a very benign modification.
Alston is himself sympathetic to this verdict, though he ultimately
rejects it. He briefly considers the objection that his approach, as it stands,
is "not permissive enough." His initial response is that "we will almost
always have something against idiosyncratic practices; and in that case it
would do no harm to let all of them in as prima facie acceptable" (p. 170).
However, he then supplies us with an argument against this "alternative":
Nevertheless there is a significant reason for doing it my way. When
a doxastic practice has persisted over a number of generations, it has
earned a right to be considered seriously in a way that [others have]
not. It is a reasonable supposition that a practice would not have persisted over large segments of the population unless it was putting
people into effective touch with some aspect(s) of reality and proving
itself as such by its fruits. But there are no such grounds for presumption in the case of idiosyncratic practices. Hence we will proceed more reasonably, as well as more efficiently, by giving initial,
ungrounded credence to only the socially established practices.
Newcomers will have to prove themselves. (p. 170)
Alston seems to be assuming here that we have some sort of choice about
whether or not we should make the modification in question. I take it,
however, that consideration of the Epistopians shows that we must make it,
i.e., that all belief-formers are in fact practically rational simply in virtue of
forming a belief. If this is so, it would seem to trump any pragmatic reasons Alston might have for "doing it [his] way."
Nevertheless, we may wonder whether Alston is in this passage identifying the source of the alleged discomfort. If so, then I think the discomfort
can be assuaged. When Alston speaks of "earning a right to be considered
seriously," or of having "grounds for presumption" that a given practice is
reliable, he is laying down a condition of rationality that is perfectly appropriate for those of us who live in a world where most idiosyncratic beliefs
and practices are defeated. In short, he is explaining why it is that the lack
of social establishment functions as an appropriate defeater for us. It is
because our experience is such that we have acquired very good reasons to
think that our idiosyncratic beliefs and practices are not reliable, and that is
precisely why we insist that "newcomers" must prove themselves. Our
experience has transformed a presumption of reliability into a presumption
of unreliability for idiosyncratic beliefs and practices. Or to put it another
way, once we are forced by our experience to attempt to distinguish reliable
practices from unreliable practices, we find that the idiosyncratic practices
are the first to go. And this presumption against the idiosyncratic has now
become (quite appropriately) entrenched within us, so that we scarcely
notice it any longer. Thus Alston's remarks are perfectly sensible for those
of us who live in our epistemic conditions. But a little reflection on the
Epistopians should reveal that his remarks do not apply in that world, and
the Epistopians are indeed practically rational in extending the "innocent
until proven guilty" presumption to "newcomers" as well.
Finally, we must consider one more possible reason for being very
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uncomfortable with this modification to Alston's "doxastic practice
approach." It is beyond doubt that some people form very repugnant
beliefs. Examples might be multiplied, but I will content myself with just
two. Let us first consider someone named Sam who believes that God told
him to shoot all of his co-workers to death. Such beliefs reek with irrationality. But now it looks as if we must say that Sam is at least prima facie
practically rational simply in virtue of forming this belief, and many may
react viscerally against this conclusion. Sam, in forming this belief, should
not be regarded as rational in any sense, one might think. My response to
this objection is that our visceral reaction will be fully accounted for if we
can show that Sam is not unqualifiedly rational, according to some sense of
rationality. Rationality, let us remember, is a slippery and multifarious
concept. An individual may be rational in one sense and simultaneously
irrational in another. For our second example, let us consider someone
named Sue who believes that freezing to death is good for her. Sue is
therefore perfectly rational, according to a "fitting-means-to-ends" concept
of rationality, if she believes that she should stand outside all night in subzero temperatures with no clothes on. However, most of us would judge
her belief that freezing to death is good for her to be irrational in some
other sense of rationality (perhaps a "proper cognitive function" sense).
But we need not judge her to be irrational in every sense in order to account
for our overall negative judgment of her rationality. Identifying just one
failure of rationality is sufficient for that. And Sam's case, I think, can be
handled in the same way. Even if we leave social establishment aside, we
may presume that there is a moral defeater mechanism that ought to be
operative in Sam, but is not! The modification we must make to Alston's
approach does require us to regard Sam as prima facie practically rational,
but it certainly does not require us to regard him as unqualifiedly rational.
The failure of a defeater mechanism in conditions where it ought to be
operative is sufficient for us to judge Sam as irrational in this belief, and the
latter judgment is sufficient to account for our visceral reaction. Also, the
fact that it is a moral defeater mechanism that has failed in Sam probably
has a great deal to do with the strength of our emotional response. But to
demand that Sam be judged irrational in every possible sense is simply to
demand too much. Sam's case, and others like it, do not give us a reason to
refrain from making the modification to Alston's approach that the
Epistopian thought experiment seems to require. I confess that I cannot
think of any other reason not to make it. It is a harmless modification.
Can we identify a benefit to regarding all belief-formers as prima facie
practically rational? Are there any possible cases such that the modified
approach seems to give the intuitively correct answer, but Alston's original
approach does not? I think there are some cases of this sort, though they are
perhaps not very plausible.s Let us consider a society that has no history of
forming beliefs about God. The formation of theological beliefs in this society is not a socially established practice. And now suppose that God desires
to be gracious to a given individual in this society, let us call her Jane, by
revealing Himself to her in some way. If there is any cognitive component
to this revelation at all, then Jane must form a theolOgical belief. Alston's
original approach entails that Jane cannot be even prima facie rational in
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forming this belief. Therefore, God cannot be gracious to Jane in this way
without simultaneously rendering her irrational. But the modified
approach entails neither of these conclusions. If it seems to us that God
ought to be able to preserve Jane's rationality and be gracious to her in this
way, then we have another reason to prefer the modified approach. To be
sure, something must be said about how Jane's rationality is to be preserved
against the force of epistemic defeat that is, even on the modified approach,
generated by the lack of social establishment. I do not know how to solve
this latter problem, so I will content myself with the conclusion that the
modified approach at least allows us to consider it as a legitimate problem
that we should try to solve, whereas Alston's original approach will not
allow us to take even that very modest view of it. 6 On the original account,
we needn't bother with it at all. Jane cannot be rational, and that is that. So
cases of this sort do seem to lend a small amount of intuitive force to the
view that the original approach is "not permissive enough."
But even if there are no practical differences at all between the two
approaches, the case of the Epistopians reveals that the modified approach
is indeed correct. All belief-formers are prima facie practically rational,
simply in virtue of forming a belief. And we may acknowledge that fact
without doing any damage at all to Alston's defense of Christian Mystical
Perception. 7
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NOTES
1. William Alston, Perceiving God (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991),
pp. 146-83. All subsequent page references refer to this volume.
2. There is no need to distinguish between prima facie rationality and unqualified rationality here, because by hypothesis there is no defeat. Thus all prima facie
rational beliefs are unqualifiedly rational beliefs, regardless of the type of rationalityin view.
3. It seems to me that the Epistopians could also present a persuasive argument analogous to the one Alston gives at the end of chapter four (pp. 178-83) for
the conclusion that they are practically rational in taking every one of their beliefs
to have been formed by a reliable mechanism. They would thereby be practically
rational in taking themselves to be justified in their beliefs, and that according to a
very strong reliabilist sense of justification. However, I will not press this point
because it is not needed here.
4. Those who do not like the mechanistic language here may regard this case
as one of those rare cases where we might have direct voluntary control over our
beliefs. The repugnance of Sam's belief may then be explained by his failure to
exercise his moral freedom in such a way as to render a correct moral judgment on
this belief.
S. Though the implausibility of the following hypothetical case (about "Jane")
would not affect the conclusion I draw from it, I do not wish to assert that it is
implausible. Indeed, one might reasonably think that such cases have been actual at
some time or other, and that some such cases are even recorded in Scripture.
Abraham's call to leave Ur of the Chaldees, Moses at the burning bush, and Saul on
the road to Damascus come immediately to mind as possible cases of idiosyncratic
belief formation, although a considerable amount of historical research is required
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to come to any firm conclusion regarding the degree of social establishment in any
particular case. Nevertheless, if it were established that these biblical figures were
not engaging in any socially established practice, then Alston's original account
would entail the unwelcome (for Jews and Christians) conclusion that they were
irrational. But the modified account I have presented here would entail only that
their rationality depends upon overcoming the epistemic defeat that arises from the
lack of social establishment. For this point (and two of these examples) I am
indebted to comments by William Hasker.
6. I suspect that a solution to this problem lies in the fact that any epistemic
defeater (in this case the lack of social establishment) can itself be defeated.
7. I am very grateful to Tom Kennedy, Sandra Visser, and Heath White for
constructive comments and criticisms of an earlier draft of this paper.

